FUNDATUN reaction to attacks of

Earth Island Institute to 

IATTC and AIDCP Agreements

 Arnaldo Badillo R.

Carlos Giménez B.

 One cannot be less than surprised by the boldness of an organization that openly summons the consumers to ignore, in its own territory, U.S. laws: the "International Dolphin Conservation Program Agreement" Convention (AIDCP, 1999, APICD in Spanish). Moreover this Agreement constitute national law in TWELVE countries that fish in the Eastern Pacific Ocean.  The Earth Island Institute Web page (EII, 2005) openly states the following1

"Earth Island Institute (EII) wishes to call the attention of consumers to the label that falsely tries to protect dolphins, for which the Department of Commerce of the United States of the Bush Administration is responsible...  consumers must avoid canned tuna with the label of the Department of Commerce (see illustration)2”.

In contradiction with the scientific evidence (“final findings”) supporting the Department of Commerce reform of the Dolphin Protection Consumers Information Act (DPCIA, 1991), EII calls to ignore this legislation and its supporting agreement (AIDCP): two interesting achievements that, properly applied, will render an effective complementary relationship between environmental protection and international trade obligations.

The attacks of EII to AIDCP began when the Agreement entered into effect in February 1999, confronting in court the Department of Commerce reform and obtaining a   favourable rule against the Commerce Department in the law suit. Additionally, their attacks to IATTC and the IDCPA.

Agreements have increased over time. In 2002, FUNDATUN wrote and published a technical report as a former reaction to the arguments of EII once known its International Marine Mammal Program. The memorandum of D. Phillipe, B. Killian, M. Berman y M.S. Palmer, on behalf of the International Marine Mammal Program of EII, to their representatives and associated firms, highlights the weaknesses of EII information sources. EII feeds its “monitoring” data bank with information provided by the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC), the international organization of states having tuna fisheries in Eastern Pacific and, ironically, the main target of their attacks. The EII document questioning the multiple efforts to meet the U. S. “dolphin safe” label by countries having tuna fleets in Eastern Pacific reveals its intentions and, we assume,  those   of  their associates, to remain firm in its position in favour of the original definition of the “dolphin safe” label. Obviously, the recent decision of the Court of Appeals refusing the Department of Commerce redefinition of the label is highlighted, but not mention is made at all of the AIDCP certification and obligations approved in El Salvador. The EII document reveals the inconsistencies of its claimed “monitoring program” when it   shows   its  disagreement with the decision of IATTC to restrict handing out of its monitoring performance data only to governments, ship owners, and captains involved (CC – FUNDATUN, 08 – 2001). Obviously, without that kind of information EII is not able to claim consistency of its monitoring activity.

Earthtrust3, another environmental organization in the United States that promotes buying and selling tuna products not involving dolphin deaths and that assumes the responsibility of the “Flipper (Seal of Approval)” ecolabel, has recognized  that their certification requisites to meet tuna protection standards go beyond those of the Department of Commerce’s (and AIDCP’s). Those requisites, as extremes for commercial activity as “Not purchase any tuna from the Eastern Tropical Pacific except that which is caught by hook and line”,  are perfectly admissible for an ecologist private program but, contrary to EII attitude, Earthtrust does not exhibit any pretension for that requisites to become a governmental trade restriction, being evidently in contradiction with the Technical Barriers  to Trade Agreement (TBT) of the WTO as technical regulations and certification standards should not go beyond necessary to meet their objectives4.

In biological and man-managed processes, sustained zero outcomes do not exist. Additionally, processes outcomes always show variability around an axial level or trend (in our case, in capture of tuna, dolphin and other marine species). What AIDCP is doing is to maintain the tendency toward lower dolphin deaths and injuries with the minimal variation, according to the TBT Agreement of the WTO5. Even being in disagree with the monitoring program of AIDCP, Earthtrust, instead of calling to disavowal of the national legislation, requires from their associates to “participate in and abide by all terms of the AIDCP monitoring program for “dolphin safe” tuna as defined in U.S. law (for tuna sold in the U.S.A.).6

AIDCP requires from any private “dolphin safe” logo or accreditation program to  manage    a      monitoring program comparable to AIDCP´s. Neither this “comparability” requisite nor observance of the preventive statements avoiding private campaigns to mislead or deceive consumer perceptions on AIDCP programs are fulfilled by EII, as their attacks to AIDCP “dolphin safe” eco-label  and the weaknesses of their ex – post monitoring activities show up. It calls our attention the outspoken version of EII about its accreditation by a national agency of the ISO 9000 quality seal, in spite of the observed deficiencies in their monitoring data gathering and processing. EII “rides” on open-sea data gathered by observers in tuna fleets fishing in Eastern Pacific. EII collects indirect (ex-post) information on assumed dolphin deaths or injures in tuna fleets through “surprise visits to canneries and docks in order to inspect captains´ logs and other paperwork that indicate whether or not dolphins were protected according to the standard”.7 If any monitoring device deserves recognition by ISO is the AIDCP monitoring program, one action somewhat neglected by IATTC.

The deficiencies of the governmental regulation of the market niche provided by the eco-labels in the United States have been pointed out somewhere else. “The lack of regulation of this growing market niche probably has encouraged many unscrupulous companies to use unsubstantiated (and) vague slogans8. According to these references, the U.S. Department of Commerce overlooks much of the “dolphin safe” tuna of the market (of the United that the government of the United  States  make  itself acquainted with the defense of AIDCP. Otherwise, ¿What is this agreements useful for if the biggest importing member of IATTC does not emphasize the defense of a legislative instrument that represents the best consensual solution to the most important environment–trade controversy of the WTO? The alternative to appeal to the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO is open again in order to protect the economic interests of the states having tuna fleets in Eastern Pacific. In fact, the practical admission by the IATTC tuna exporting countries of the discriminatory mechanism embodied in the AIDCP is not representing today a real guarantee for its “dolphin safe” tuna to access the market of the United States.

Michel Scott (1998), senior researcher of IATTC pointed out that of the “dolphin-safe” tuna entering the market of the United States only 13 % of the tonnage came from the trips to the Eastern Pacific Ocean, under observation. The rest came from   trips to other parts of the world receiving also the “dolphin safe” certification of the U.S. Department of Commerce without subjection to the same monitoring procedure. This represents an evident case of trade discrimination against the fleets fishing in Eastern Pacific. Non-discrimination is a fundamental principle of the trade multilateral agreements in addition to the principles of harmonization, transparency and equivalency of technical regulations and assessment results embodied in the TBT Agreement of the WTO. All these principles are fully fulfilled by the monitoring program of the IATTC. The  alleged claims of EII are far from satisfaction of these requisites of the TBT. 

An action deserving a detailed study is that IATTC affected tuna sectors convert the current character of the U.S. tuna eco-label, a barrier to trade more than an environmental protection devise, in a differentiation instrument based on the quality of tuna products from Eastern Tropical Pacific, following tastes and needs of the american and european consumers. The rigorous and transparent characterization of the quality basis of these products, as opposed to those of lower quality alternatives, is the first step of a new strategy to improve the access possibilities to the big markets.

The design and adoption of a private certification mark9 could be an excellent alternative, if certified by international standards of quality based in more solid arguments than those of the EII´s “monitoring” program10.

 

  

1 Earth Island Institute (2005). News Room. U.S. Department of Commerce. “Dolphin-Safe Label is a Death Certificate for Dolphins!” April, 2005.

2 Using inappropriate expressions for an ecological organization pretending world coverage of their activities, EII tries to substitute empirical and scientific evidences with depreciatory expressions such as: “… the Bush Commerce Department, bowing to trade pressure from Mexican tuna millionaires and in order to avoid sanctions from the World Trade Organization (WTO), attempted to weaken the standards for the “dolphin safe” mark on the last day of 2001”. Ibid. 

3 Earthtrust (2003).  Flipper  Seal of Approval. Dolphin-safe Tuna Certification Program. Fact   Sheet. 2003

4 Scott, Michel (1998).  “The Tuna – Dolphin Controversy”.   IATTC, 1998

5 “…less-trade restrictive options, such as more accurate (and less exaggerated) warning requirements,  need to be explored… (To avoid) unnecessary obstacles to trade, the Agreement encourages WTO Members to develop technical regulations and standards that are based on product performance, rather than design requirements”. In: Motaal, D. A. (2000). “Overview of the World Trade Organization Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade”. Trade and Environmental  Division, WTO.

6 Earthtrust (2003). Op. cit.

7 Ref.: www.eco-labels.org

8 Fulmer, Melinda. (2001). “¿Can Consumers Trust Eco-labels?”. Los Angeles Times. August 26, 2001

9 “The certification trademark (CTM) is a private right. The property and administration belong to an association of manufacturers or producers. They are designed to certify quality, characteristics, origins, materials, etc. They have to be renewed after a certain period of time... The protection of CTMs is based on private actions. The issue of homonymous CTMs (as in geographical indications) does not exist. There must be just one right holder… They have collateral protection: Protection against use in other products such as T-shirts,  mugs, etc.” In: Vivas Eugui, David. (2000). “Negotiations on geographical indications in the TRIPs Council and their effects on the WTO agricultural negotiations: Implications for developing countries and the case of Venezuela”. Independent Advisor. Geneva, January 2000, p. 212. 

10 Ibid

 

 

 

 

 


 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNSUSTAINABLE FISHERY  

Should we believe in an eco-label that induce fishing practices that: sacrifice young tuna and other marine species, and in addition endanger tenable fishery?

  Rectángulo redondeado: UNSUSTAINABLE FISHERY  
Should we believe in an eco-label that induce fishing practices that: sacrifice young tuna and other marine species, and in addition endanger tenable fishery?
 

SUSTAINABLE FISHERY:  DOLPHIN SAFE – APICD

Yellowfin tuna international market is ruled by an eco-label collectively  adopted by fishing countries in the Eastern Pacific Ocean.

 

  Rectángulo redondeado: SUSTAINABLE FISHERY:  DOLPHIN SAFE – APICD 

Yellowfin tuna international market is ruled by an eco-label collectively  adopted by fishing countries in the Eastern Pacific Ocean.